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ABSTRACT: One cannot question the scientific evidence of  the deterioration of  the planet’s 
environmental quality and the global climate emergency. The apparent growth of  denialism in the 
climate debate does not bring anything positive. The European Green Deal (“EGD”) appeared as a 
consolidated strategy to fight climate change, but the world is not the same as it was in December 2019. 
Even before the COVID-19 crisis, there were doubts about the viability of  such a powerful political 
and financial investment. As we try to deal with the fallout of  the COVID-19 pandemic and guide 
our economies to recovery, risks of  diversion or misuse of  these environmental funds seemed possible. 
Fortunately, environmental common sense seems to have prevailed. In an unforeseen but potentially 
happy marriage, the Recovery Plan for Europe and the EGD were united in their purposes and in their 
concrete action. The European Climate Law (“ECL”) is the first binding legal instrument born of  the 
EGD. With a non-mishap-free preparation process, the final version provokes contradictory feelings. 
First, the perception that one could have gone further is inescapable. On the other hand, what is already 
acquired is relevant and Europe is unlikely to go back on this essential matter. There are innovations 
in the ECL that significantly altered the Commission’s original proposal, introducing new elements. But 
while some of  these changes appear to have been forced by the new circumstances, others may be proof  
that Member States do not have the same predisposition to deal with the objectives of  the EGD and the 
fight against climate change. The safest way to contradict this inclination is to strengthen the ECL as a 
key tool in the implementation of  the European Union’s environmental and policy strategy.
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1. Introduction – the path towards the European Climate Law
There is no longer time (or patience) to seriously discuss the various types of  
environmental denialism that seem to be in the public and political debate, in an apparent 
parallel effort to the scientific arguments that demonstrate precisely the opposite. Of  
course, scientific evidence of  the deterioration of  the planet’s environmental quality 
and the global climate emergency does not rule out the possibility of  debate, as 
Michael Shellenberger’s1 disenchanted new scepticism is an example of, despite the 
poor choice of  basic arguments and solutions advocated by the author, it is a position 
to be considered.2  However, no matter how enticing this position as a whole might 
seem, we argue that from its lack of  argumentative consistency, it should only be used 
as constructive criticism – a way to facilitate paths or improving public policies that 
inevitably will have to be followed. The predisposition to climate dialogue should never 
be a pretext for perpetually jeopardising the fundamental choices, and especially the 
legal and existential changes that are manifestly urgent and necessary.
Scientific consensus in this area exists as much as the concept itself  manages to 
understand. This is a situation that requires immediate and definitive action, if  there 
is any chance of  reversing the damage already done to our planet. As the Secretary 
General of  the United Nations, António Guterres, stated: “the climate emergency is a race 
we are losing, but it is a race we can win”.3 
In December 2019, the European Union (“EU”) has established an ambitious 
action plan in the form of  the European Green Deal (“EGD”) as a consolidated 
strategy to fight climate change. And this position is not a recent one, the EU has a long 
history of  pushing forth the need to protect the environment. Thanks to Europe and 
other groups of  countries, international organisations – and mainly worldwide public 
opinion which takes the environmental emergency seriously – the effort culminated 
in The Paris Climate Agreement of  December 2015, a testament to the success of  
EU and French diplomacy, encouraging the Union to be even more ambitious with 
its goals regarding emission reduction, renewable energy and energy efficiency.4 Since 
1973 the EU has approved seven multi-annual environmental actions5, making it one 
of  the most active actors in the field of  environmental protection. 
We cannot deny, however, that there was a political and almost an emotional step 
back with the dawn of  climate change denying political movements and politicians 
all over the globe, which turned the conversation around environmental protection 
into one of  extremes. Donald Trump in the United States and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil 
occupying high office positions and denying the ever-growing scientific evidence 
supporting the fact that we are in the midst of  a climate emergency have undermined 
1 Michael Shellenberger, Apocalypse Never: why environmental alarmism hurts us all (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2020).
2 Peter Gleick, “Book review: bad science and bad arguments abound in ‘Apocalypse Never’ by 
Michael Shellenberger”, review of  Apocalypse Never: Why Environmental Alarmism Hurts Us All, by 
Michael Shellenberger, Yale Climate Connections, July 15, 2020, https://yaleclimateconnections.
org/2020/07/review-bad-science-and-bad-arguments-abound-in-apocalypse-never/.
3 United Nations, “The climate crisis – A race we can win”, accessed April 15, 2021, https://
www.un.org/en/un75/climate-crisis-race-we-can-win#:~:text=The%202015%20Paris%20
Agreement%20on,even%20further%2C%20to%201.5%20degrees.
4 Marco Siddi, The European Green Deal: assessing its current state and future implementation, FIIA Working 
Paper 114, May 2020, 1, https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/the-european-green-deal.
5 Carlos Abreu Amorim, “Editorial of  June 2020”, UNIO The Official Blog, June 2020, https://
officialblogofunio.com/2020/06/01/editorial-of-june-2020/.
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global cooperation on tackling climate change.6 The main negative effect of  these 
political positions was to give voice to those who were not right and were not even 
able to mount capable arguments, by turning the environmental debate into a matter 
of  political opinion. 
A prime example of  this was President Trump’s withdrawal of  the United States 
from the Paris Agreement and his fiery allegation that climate change was a “hoax 
created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive”.7 Undeniably, 
this has put a dent on the credibility of  the Agreement for some of  the more sceptical. 
This was a stance corrected by Joe Biden in his first days in office that did return the 
relevance of  the Paris Agreement and proved that the EU had always been right. On the 
other hand, we have people who firmly believe the scientific evidence which supports 
that we are currently living through a climate emergency, who when confronted by 
climate change deniers tend to close rank and defend radical change in all dimensions 
of  human existence, seeming to want the eradication of  the modern way of  life, with 
all its comforts and benefits. This polarisation tends to lead most people out of  the 
conversation about the environment and what we can do to protect it, because they 
do not agree with either side.8 Recently deceased Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg once said: “Fight for the things you care about, but do it in a way that will lead others 
to join you”. This is where the EU comes in. The EU had to prove that it remains on 
the front line of  the fight against climate change, and this is a role which it intends to 
continue to fulfil in the future. The conclusive step was taken in December 2019 when 
the Commission presented the Communication on the EGD, highlighting that climate 
and environmental-related challenges are “this generation’s defining task”.9 The EGD is 
a long thought out strategy to make Europe living proof  that it is possible to have a 
thriving and sustainable, resource-efficient and competitive economy, and to be the 
world reference in the fight against climate change.10 The two main objectives of  this 
ambitious plan – to boost the efficient use of  resources by moving to a clean, circular 
economy, and to restore biodiversity and cut pollution need to become a reality. A 
wide-reaching concomitant action by all sectors of  society is necessary. The EGD11 
implementation requires a significant investment, calculated by the Commission to be 
EUR 260 billion yearly by 2030, together with other parcel investments, namely the 
Investment Plan for a Sustainable Europe which will reach EUR 1 trillion over the next 
decade.12 Even before the COVID-19 crisis, there were doubts about the viability of  
such a powerful financial investment. There was talk of  “reshuffling” pre-existing EU 
funds, but the plan is highly reliant on expected mobilisation of  national and private 
resources.13 As we try to deal with the fall-out of  the COVID-19 pandemic and recover 
our economy, risks of  diversion or misuse of  these environmental funds seem possible. 
6 Marco Siddi, The European Green Deal, 6.
7 Michael Greshko, “The global dangers of  Trump’s climate denial”, National Geographic, November 
2016, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/president-trump-global-climate-change-
denial-environment.
8 Carlos Abreu Amorim, “Editorial of  June 2020”.
9 Marco Siddi, The European Green Deal, 6.
10 Mauro Albrizio, “L’Europa siamo noi: Insieme per un Green New Deal europeo”, in Un Green New 
Deal per l’Europa, Le idee e le sfide per rilanciare il progetto europeo (Milano: Edizioni Ambiente, 2019).
11 European Commission, “A European Green Deal – Striving to be the first climate neutral continent”, 
accessed May 17, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-
deal_en.
12 Carlos Abreu Amorim, “Editorial of  June 2020”.
13 Marco Siddi, The European Green Deal, 13.
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The climate emergency and the deterioration of  our planet will not disappear or 
be resolved because we are dealing with a different crisis.14 As we have seen happening 
with the 2008 economic crisis, there are reports of  a decrease in pollutant emissions 
caused by the current economic contraction. However, this reduction of  emissions can 
be put into perspective if  we look at what happened during other economic recovery 
periods, such as after the Spanish flu of  1918, the Great Depression of  1929, and the 
financial crisis of  2008. After a period of  shrinkage of  the emissions level, followed 
a period of  sharp increase due to the economic recovery.15 With this in mind, the 
European Commission rightly rebutted the notion that the public health crisis should 
lead to the scrapping of  the EU climate effort. More than ever, the Commission’s focus 
on the advantages of  technology and digitalisation can come into its own, shifting the 
attention from inefficient production facilities reliant on coal and other highly polluting 
energy sources, to technologically developed ones, which take advantage of  renewable 
or less carbon-intensive sources such as natural gas. Delaying this transition, not only 
can put at risk the chances of  ever recovering from this climate emergency, but also can 
reveal itself  to be even more expensive than initially thought.16
Fortunately, environmental common sense seems to have prevailed in the minds 
of  European statesmen despite known difficulties. In an unforeseen but potentially 
happy marriage, the Recovery Plan for Europe17 and the EGD were united in their 
purposes and in their concrete action.18 Just as there is no room to seriously debate with 
climate denialists, we are no longer able to wait for the solution of  a bigger problem, to 
only address this issue after solving all the other problems that may exist in its vicinity. 
The European Climate Law (“ECL”) is the first binding law instrument born of  the 
EGD. With a non-mishap-free preparation process, the results of  the Agreement 
obtained in April and adopted in May of  this year provoke contradictory feelings. 
First, the perception that one could have gone further is unescapable. On the other 
hand, what is already acquired is very relevant and Europe is unlikely to go back on this 
essential matter. 
The main objective of  this reflection is to try to understand the scope and some 
of  the impacts of  the changes that the Commission’s draft regulation of  March 2020 
has seen until its final version. Whether this ECL corresponds to the ambitions of  the 
EGD or whether politics, fears, and cloaked denialism are being able to reschedule the 
solutions that scientific knowledge says cannot be delayed is unclear.
14 Milan Elkerbout et al., “The European Green Deal after Corona: implications for EU climate 
policy”, CEPS Policy Insights, March 2020, 2-5, https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/the-
european-green-deal-after-corona/.
15 Nataly Machado, “Thinking about the post-COVID-19 world is putting the European Green Deal 
into practice: this is the time for the European Union to respond in line with «green»”, UNIO The Official 
Blog, June 2020, https://officialblogofunio.com/2020/06/16/thinking-about-the-post-COVID-19-
world-is-putting-the-european-green-deal-into-practice-this-is-the-time-for-the-european-union-to-
respond-in-line-with-green/.
16 Milan Elkerbout et al., “The European Green Deal after Corona”, 2-5.
17 European Commission, “Recovery plan for Europe”, accessed May 24, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/
info/strategy/recovery-plan-europe_en#:~:text=NextGenerationEU%20is%20a%20€750,the%20
current%20and%20forthcoming%20challenges.
18 Lia Montalvi, Ci Salverà L’Europa? Un futuro da scrivere tra Recovery Fund e Green Deal europeo (Reggio 
Emilia; Diarkos, 2021).
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2. The provisional agreement – a definitive step towards a 
Union-wide climate regulation
In March 2020, the Commission proposed the European Climate Law Regulation 
(“ECLR”),19 which has undergone several alterations since the initial proposal. In 
September 2020 binding greenhouse gas reduction levels that should be reached by 2030 
were established, as enshrined in Recital 17 and Article 2(3) of  the original proposal. 
The target was set at 55% compared to 1990 levels, to be reached domestically and 
economy-wide20. This resulted in alterations to Recital 17, Article 1, and Article 3(2), 
whereas Article 2(3)(4) was deleted, and Article 2a was added. 
The accordance of  the proposed ECLR with the 2030 target on greenhouse gas 
emissions is the starting point to reach the 2050 climate neutrality objective21, which has 
been in the horizon since November 2018 with the presentation by the Commission 
of  a long-term strategic vision to reduce greenhouse gas emissions called Going climate-
neutral by 2050 – A strategic long-term vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate-
neutral EU economy, following the steps taken by the Paris Agreement (2015).22 In May 
2021, the provisional agreement on the European Climate Law was adopted, which 
represents a key milestone for the von der Leyen Commission, delivering on one of  
the commitments announced in July 2019.23 
This agreement introduces the following elements: (i) enlarges the presence of  the 
ambitious 2030 climate target of  at least 55% reduction of  net emissions as compared 
to 1990, better explaining its importance and how it is to be achieved; (ii) affords 
clarity on the contribution of  emission reductions and removals; (iii)  recognizes the 
need to enhance the EU’s carbon sink through a more ambitious land use, land use 
change and forestry Regulation, for which the Commission will make proposals in June 
2021; (iv) introduces a process for setting a 2040 climate target, taking into account an 
indicative greenhouse gas budget for 2030-2050 to be published by the Commission; a 
commitment to negative emissions after 2050; (v) the establishment of  the European 
Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change; (vi) strong coherence across Union 
policies with the climate neutrality objective; and (vii)  a commitment to engage with 
sectors to prepare sector-specific roadmaps charting the path to climate neutrality in 
different areas of  the economy.24 
This is a more wide-reaching amendment which significantly altered the 
Commission’s original proposal, introducing new elements and taking into account the 
situation created by the COVID-19 pandemic. 
19 European Commission, Fact Sheet “The European Climate Law”, March 2020, https://ec.europa.
eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/FS_20_360.
20 This is a more ambitious than the EU’s initial nationally determined contribution (NDC) under the 
Paris Agreement of  reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40% by 2030 compared to 1990 
(accessed July 03, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/negotiations/paris_en).
21 European Commission, Amended proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the 
Council on establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulation (EU) 
2018/1999 (European Climate Law), Brussels, September 17, 2020, COM(2020) 563 final, 1 and 4-5.
22 European Commission, “Going climate-neutral by 2050 – A strategic long-term vision for a 
prosperous, modern, competitive and climate-neutral EU economy”, Publications Office of  the 
European Union, 2019, accessed July 03, 2021, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/
publication/92f6d5bc-76bc-11e9-9f05-01aa75ed71a1.
23 European Commission, “European Climate Law”.
24 European Commission, Press Release “Commission welcomes provisional agreement on the 
European Climate Law”, April 2021, accessed July 23, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_1828.
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3. The relevant alterations to the initial ECL proposal
To start off, the Recitals of  the new proposal were exponentially extended, in 
order to clarify some points and add new considerations. The EU’s commitment to the 
climate matter and the reaching of  the objectives established on the Paris Agreement 
are reiterated in Recital 1, something which was not mentioned previously but clarifies 
the EU’s position on the matter, recognizing the serious threat that climate change 
presents. It also adds, in Recital 5, the principles that should govern Member States 
when acting under the ECL, the action should be “precautionary”, applying the “polluter 
pays” principle, the energy efficiency first principle, and the “do no harm” principle.25 
In succeeding Recitals the scope of  action of  the ECL is broadened to specifically 
mention sectors of  the economy which were previously ignored, and clarifies the 
Union’s position regarding subsequent steps – the addition of  Recital 10a, for example, 
which mentions that the Union should continue its action on the climate matter past 
2050 –, reiterates the cooperation and commitment of  all Union Institutions, as well as 
it recognizes the importance of  climate diplomacy, and the fact that countries outside 
of  the Union might agree on the climate matter. Recital 10b was added and mentions 
that the Commission intends to propose the climate boarder adjustment mechanism, 
in accordance with World Trade Organization Rules. The ECL sends a strong political 
signal to the EU’s partners and businesses wishing to work within it. The impasse 
regarding the new EU-Mercosur trade agreement is a good example of  this, until Brazil 
makes a commitment to curb deforestation in the Amazon rainforest it will not be 
resolved.26 And this stance is likely to be repeated as other agreements are negotiated 
and as it becomes clear that the EU wants to create environmental changes that are 
long-lasting and influence others to follow.27
Nonetheless, we also see a step back regarding the extent of  the Union’s 
intervention – namely the Commission – on legislative proposals and other initiatives. 
The writing of  Recital 14 introduces a segment which could, in practice, result in an 
excuse/way out of  climate related obligations for Member States, arguing that the 
adverse effects of  climate change could exceed the adaptive capacities of  Member 
States. Although true, compared to the previous wording, it reads like a safety net for 
when the agreed targets are not reached. In the same Recital, at the end, it seems to 
want to bring the climate question back into the scope of  Member States and limit the 
Union’s intervention, in a stroke of  national protectionism. Further in Recital 21, the 
same happens, the initial wording which states that the ability of  the Commission to 
adopt appropriate legislation under the competence attributed by Article 290 of  the 
Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union is eliminated in favour of  citing 
the various climate objectives and deadlines. From the beginning, we see a shrinkage 
of  the possible intervention at the Union level in favour of  intervention at State level. 
Although the need for cooperation is recognized, and it is stated that the Union should 
adopt measures taking into account the principle of  subsidiarity in accordance with 
Article 5 of  the Treaty on European Union.28 
25 Council of  the European Union, Outcome of  Proceedings “Proposal for a Regulation of  the 
European Parliament and of  the Council establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and 
amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law), May 5, 2021(OR. en) 8440/21, 4 and 8.
26 Anthony Boadle, “Brazil pledge on Amazon needed to save EU-Mercosur trade deal -EU diplomat”, 
Reuters, December 7, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/eu-mercosur-brazil-idUSKBN28H1SP.
27 European Commission, Fact Sheet “The European Climate Law”.
28 Council of  the European Union, Outcome of  Proceedings “Proposal for a Regulation of  the 
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Addressing the specific content of  the Articles, it becomes even clearer that to 
reach the provisional agreement the legislative power attributed to the Commission on 
the original proposal had to be significantly reduced. Article 3 in the original proposal 
gave the Commission power to adopt delegated acts with the aim of  achieving climate 
neutrality, and what should be taken into account in the exercise of  that power.29 
Now, this same Article is completely overhauled, giving the Commission more of  
an assessment/evaluation role of  the acts adopted by Member States, and only if  
things are not on track towards climate neutrality should the Commission intervene 
in accordance with the Treaties, including through legislative proposals. In short, what 
started as a blanket possibility to adopt measures and put forth legislative proposals 
was turned into a possibility of  intervention in very specific situations.30 
This is quite a blow to the Commission’s ambitious plan for the EU’s transition to 
a sustainable and green economy and for the roadmap it had for the fulfilment of  the 
climate objectives to which we are internationally bound through the Paris Agreement. 
Coordination is important, but at the same time, if  Member States are, arguably, left 
with too much latitude to adopt their own policies dependant on national political wills 
and understandings, there is a risk that countries will diverge in the policies, which will 
make the attainment of  Europe wide, uniform strategy more difficult. This could lead 
to a significant gap between countries that are more advanced in this field and already 
have legislative instruments in place regarding the green transition, and countries 
which, by virtue of, either, lack of  resources, stability or will are trailing countries in 
the former category. If  the Commission could act to adopt initiatives and legislation 
to tackle the climate matter first and foremost instead of  in a subsidiary capacity, there 
was a potential to make climate action more immediate and effective, freeing it of  
the excessive politicisation to which it has been submitted to this point. Since the 
Commission’s role is to pursue the general interest of  the Union, independently of  
the interests of  Member States, it would be easier to put forth a clear sequencing of  
measures which enable people to see how they will be affected by a certain action, as 
well as adopting binding action plans which include firm timelines for implementing 
the EU’s climate goals. All of  this is to ensure that the policies enacted under the ECL 
are fair, durable, trusted by the public, positively reinforcing, innovative, and visionary.31 
But if  the measures on climate are left to Member States, this could mean each country 
will have their own plans adapted to their economic needs, perhaps relegating the need 
to respond to the climate emergency to second or third place, and making a grand 
stand of  protecting national pollutant industries and jobs above what is stipulated in 
the ECL. The infringement mechanisms could be a path to be followed, although we 
have serious doubts that they are enough. João Pedro Matos Fernandes, responding to 
criticism, recognized that some steps back had to be taken, since the implementation 
of  the ECL will require profound and ambitious alterations32 and thus a consensus was 
European Parliament and of  the Council”, 16, 24 and 26.
29 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the Council 
establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 
(European Climate Law), March 4, 2020, COM (2020) 80 final, 15.
30 Council of  the European Union, Outcome of  Proceedings “Proposal for a Regulation of  the 
European Parliament and of  the Council”, 34-38.
31 Heather Grabbe and Stefan Lehne, “Climate politics in a fragmented Europe”, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace Working Paper, December 2019, 7-8, accessed July 1, 2021, https://
carnegieendowment.org/files/Lehne_Grabbe_Climate_v2.pdf.
32 Rita Siza, “A primeira Lei do Clima da UE já está no papel, e em breve estará em todo o lado”, 
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necessary. But we must question if  this recoil does not have the potential to endanger 
the very core of  the ECL.
Article 8a of  the new proposal adds that the Commission should engage with 
stakeholders of  the various economic sectors, specifically those who choose to 
voluntarily create sector-specific roadmaps towards achieving the Union’s climate 
neutrality objective by 2050 in a bid to facilitate dialogue at the Union level.33 Although 
we recognize that dialogue is important, perhaps there is potential here for an abuse 
of  this mechanism. In a way, we are giving the industries which are at the root of  most 
greenhouse gas emissions and other forms of  pollution the opportunity to put their 
economic interests above the environmental needs of  the planet, by not reaching as far 
as they could – from an economic standpoint – with their roadmaps because that could 
be temporarily reducing their profit margins. We are not referring to those companies 
to which an ambitions green transition investment could mean collapse, those need 
support, but mainly multinational companies with vast economic power which are in a 
place to transition rapidly and efficiently but choose to not do so because, from a profit 
standpoint, it does not favour them. We argue that the Commission should be cautious 
and remain vigilant in this case, by carefully analysing the roadmaps to see if  they are 
reaching their full potential and the full capabilities of  the companies that propose 
them. Furthermore, this merges with the EU’s concern of  creating public trust in 
the ECL and the policies adopted under it. By closely monitoring the implementation 
and enforcement of  climate policy the Commission would be maintaining a sense of  
accountability to the end-goal of  climate neutrality by 2050. In addition, the Commission 
could ensure that climate measures are having a real impact, that governments are 
committed to action, not only through rhetoric, and that both the EU and Member 
States are making sure big polluters are abiding by the rules and joining everyone in the 
fight against climate change.34
Still, the ECLR addresses a gap which was criticised by academics in the previous 
proposal.35 In Article 2aa, it calls for the amendment of  Regulation (EC) No. 401/2009, 
establishing the European Scientific Advisory Board (“Advisory Board”), which will be 
essential to ensure the proper functioning of  the ECL, guaranteeing that any action 
adopted under it is up to date with the latest scientific knowledge, be it by the Union be 
it by Member States.36 The Advisory Board is a very important link in the chain It will 
Público, June 30, 2021, https://www.publico.pt/2021/06/30/mundo/noticia/primeira-lei-clima-ue-
ja-papel-breve-estara-lado-1968595.
33 Council of  the European Union, Outcome of  Proceedings “Proposal for a Regulation of  the 
European Parliament and of  the Council”, 49.
34 Heather Grabbe and Stefan Lehne, Climate politics in a fragmented Europe, 9-10.
35 A report commissioned by the European Climate Foundation and elaborated by the Ecologic Institute 
before the publication of  the original ECL proposal already defended the creation of  an independent 
advisory body to support the EU climate action, arguing it essential for its success (accessed July 01, 2021, 
https://www.ecologic.eu/sites/default/files/publication/2020/climatelawsineurope_fullreport_0.
pdf). In May 2020, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety recognized 
the importance of  creating such an organism, proposing that the original ECL proposal be altered to 
include an independent scientific advisory panel on climate change, to be called European Panel on 
Climate Change (EPCC) (accessed July 01, 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/
ENVI-PR-648563_EN.pdf). Authors such Alina Averchenkova followed in the same vain; in her paper 
“The design of  an independent expert advisory mechanism under the European Climate Law: What are 
the options?” she proposes a creation of  an advisory board under the ECL, taking as examples advisory 
boards created at national level which produced favourable results, such as in the United Kingdom.
36 Council of  the European Union, Outcome of  Proceedings “Proposal for a Regulation of  the 
European Parliament and of  the Council”, 29-31.
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consist of  15 scientific experts appointed for four years, and will provide independent 
scientific advice, stronger provisions on adaptation to climate change, strong coherence 
across Union policies with the climate neutrality objective, and a commitment to engage 
with sectors to prepare sector-specific roadmaps charting the path to climate neutrality 
in different areas of  the economy.37 Independent advisory bodies such as this can hold 
governments accountable for policy enactment, as well as lend credibility to the climate 
targets and their underlying policies. They are also shown to increase transparency, 
legitimacy of  policymaking, contributing to increased support for the legislation, be it 
from the general public, businesses, civil society or politicians.38
4. Conclusion
Some of  the changes from the provisional agreement reveal a tendency of  
Member States to keep competences at the national level, which we do not believe to 
be reasonable regarding matters such as the climate matter. Since all Member States are 
affected by climate change and environment destruction, a wide-ranging, concerted, all-
encompassing action is essential if  we wish to have any hopes of  reversing the damage. 
To show its commitment to the climate matter, the EU has put the abovementioned 
objectives at the root of  the COVID-19 recovery plan for Europe.39  The ECL no 
longer has the same socio-economic background as when it was announced, now 
there are very clear economic consequences from the health crisis that need to be 
resolved which are undeniable.40  Here, we have an opportunity to jumpstart a new era 
of  the European project, based on a green, fair and digital economy. There is a need to 
understand that scrapping any part of  the EGD or the Climate Law, as some Member 
States have suggested, is a mistake.41 We must fight against the human tendency of  
falling back into old habits in moments of  crisis, since the climate emergency will 
disappear or stop, just because it would be easier to go back to pollutant industrial 
means of  production.42
One of  the EU’s great strengths is that European governing institutions still 
largely base policy on advice from independent scientific experts, hence eliminating 
a great enemy of  policy consistency and staying power – political will. Unfortunately, 
national governments do not always operate under the same principle which could 
potentially undercut the implementation of  effective, evidence-based climate change 
policies consistently over several decades as it is required to achieve the EU’s climate 
objective and the objectives enshrined in the Paris Agreement. Additionally, the politics 
of  climate change are already an extremely divisive and complicated matter. Allowing 
climate intervention in a non-comprehensive manner, putting Member States at the 
forefront of  policymaking, could deepen the divisions between the EU and Member 
States, as well as the differences between rural and urban regions, generations, and 
37 European Commission, Press Release “Commission welcomes provisional agreement”.
38 Alina Averchenkova, “The design of  an independent expert advisory mechanism under the European 
Climate Law: What are the options?”, Policy Publication, London School of  Economics and Political 
Science, September 3, 2020, 8, accessed May, 24, 2021, https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/
publication/the-design-of-an-independent-expert-advisory-mechanism-under-the-european-climate-law/.
39 European Commission, “Recovery plan for Europe”, accessed May 24, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/
info/strategy/recovery-plan-europe_en#:~:text=NextGenerationEU%20is%20a%20€750,the%20
current%20and%20forthcoming%20challenges.
40 Nataly Machado, “Thinking about the post-COVID-19 world”.
41 Milan Elkerbout et al., “The European Green Deal after Corona”, 2-5.
42 Carlos Abreu Amorim, “Editorial of  June 2020”.
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social classes. Which in turn could lead to toxic political fights and numerous impasses 
deepening existing power inequalities and limiting the economic and social justice, 
major preoccupations of  the EGD and the ECL.43 Given the climate emergency, we do 
not have the luxury of  letting yet another strategy to combat climate change stagnate 
into oblivion. 
43 Heather Grabbe and Stefan Lehne, Climate politics in a fragmented Europe, 9 and 15.
